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* This paper elaborates on remarks made at the American Economic
Association meetings, January 1995, in Washington D.C., at a Panel Discussion
on the Clinton administration's trade policy. The Panel included two highly
distinguished trade experts: the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers,
Laura Tyson, and Anne Krueger, the President-elect of the American Economic
Association; and Rudiger Dornbusch, the wellknown macroeconomist. I have
used this occasion to raise some uncommon questions and to provide a frank
and at times critical commentary on the current trends in US trade policy
precisely because we have correctly applauded the policy because of its free-
trade thrust while ignoring its downside which requires correction.
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A common, and indeed plausible, complaint of the Clinton administration
is that many of its policy successes have been discounted, even disregarded,
by hostile media. In trade policy, however, I would argue that the opposite is
true: the administration's successes have been exaggerated and its failings
have been ignored.
I will address the successes first, and the failures next. But before I do
that, let me dissociate myself from what I regard as essentially quibbling
complaints that have been directed at the President's trade policy.
i. The Quibbles:
Much has been made of the President's wrongheaded emphasis on
"competitiveness". You generally cannot put a politician's precise words
through the wringer of economic logic without drawing blood. But, frankly, it is a
mug's game: why do it? When Presidents talk of "competing" with other nations,
they surely mean it in the broader sense of improving the rank-ordering of their
nations in terms of good (and bad) indices of economic prosperity. Just recall
how England and the Netherlands were engaged in rivalry in the eighteenth
century. That the US and the Pacific nations saw themselves in a similar light
recently is wellknown, and as I remarked (in a phraseology which caught on),
the United States did suffer from a Diminished Giant Syndrome vis-a-vis these
nations1. This syndrome had the good effect of fueling the search for policies to
improve the economic performance of the US economy while it also had the
bad effect of producing the militancy towards Japan that produced the ill-
considered Japan policy that I turn to later.
Rather than quibble, as I am afraid that Paul Krugman (one of his
generation's most distinguished trade economists) did recently in Foreign
Affairs about the use of the word "competitiveness" by the President, and for
that matter by (former) bureaucrats such as Clyde Prestowitz and policy wonks
such as Messrs. Cohen and Zysman of BRIE who are easy prey, I think that the
debate ought to be about the policies that these gentlemen advocate to
advance our prosperity.
1
 Cf. mv Protectionism. 1987 Bertil Ohlin Lectures, MIT Press:Cambridge, 1988, and the joint
articles with my student Douglas Irwin, now at Chicago.
3
In regard to these policies again, I believe that Paul Krugman's critique of
the Clinton administration's focus on trade as a major area of concern is
somewhat off the mark. My suspicion is that Krugman greatly underestimates
both the gains that can accrue from freer trade and, its flip side, the cost of
protection. Thus, in his earlier book on The Age of Diminished Expectations, he
dismissed the cost of protection as low, with that particular part of the book
highlighted in an op.ed. article by the sponsor of his book, The Washington
Post. The fallacy of this view has been argued ably by yet another brilliant
student of mine, Robert Feenstra — Laura Tyson, Paul Krugman and Robert
Feenstra, I am proud to say, are all my former MIT students — in the American
Economic Association's Journal of Economic Perspectives (1994). Feenstra's
scholarly critique draws on a large recent literature on the subject. The
Krugman view has been challenged also by the growth economist Paul Romer
who argues for extremely large estimates of the cost of protection in his recent
article in the Journal of Development Economics.2
I also worry that Krugman tends to imply, and is always understood by
his lay readers to imply, that the "fundamentals" such as investment, savings
and technical change are the key things to focus on rather than trade policy,
and that therefore these are independent of trade opportunity and policy. But
this view is fundamentally flawed. For instance, export-led investment and
growth can occur and, according to most trade and developmental economists
and historians, does occur. For instance, the phenomenal growth of the Far
Eastern nations in the 1950s and 1960s in particular, was surely due to
expanding trade opportunities, garnered by an export-promoting trade strategy,
which led to increased marginal efficiency of capital, an increasing investment
rate and accommodating increase in savings to "miracle" levels. To look at
these huge investment and savings rates, and to say that therefore it was all a
matter simply of high investment and savings rates and little else is to stay put
2
 Romer's article was recently reviewed in the celebrated Economic Focus column in The
Economist. Theoretically, of course, this cost of protection could even be 100% of GNP: thus,
consider an imported factor of production to be "essential" for production as would be the case
for a conventional Cobb-Douglas production function, in which case autarky would lead to zero
GNP! There is therefore nothing inherently inevitable about low" cost-of-protection estimates,
as I argued way back in my 1966 Frank Graham Lecture at Princeton University.
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with the hands of the clock and to forget about the clock's mechanism3 . The
criticism of the administration's concern with trade policy and open markets as
somehow ignoring the real "fundamentals" rests on this type of "arithmetical"
approach to economic policy that the administration is right to ignore.
But these quibbles and fallacies aside, let me confess that the
administration economists did raise legitimate and large concerns on our part
by suggesting, at the outset, that selective industrial policy was a good idea
whose time had finally arrived. I raised serious doubts about this view in
reviewing Laura Tyson's book, Who's Bashing Whom? in a long review article
in The New Republic (May 1993); and I have seen nothing that persuades me
otherwise. My attitude remains the same as that of the Nobel laureate Robert
Solow who taught both me and Laura Tyson. He observed wryly once: "I know
that there are industries where a dollar worth of output is really worth four; my
problem is that I do not know which ones they are". But, to be fair, the Clinton
administration seems to have kept reasonably away from the selectivity which
was its main advisers' major obsession.4 Perhaps there was learning from the
pointed criticism that I advanced (assuming that Laura read my review);
perhaps it was endogenous dawning of good sense. Either way, I have few
complaints.
One more thing: the President and his economists come frequently under
3
 For this flawed approach to analyzing the Far Eastern growth experience, see Krugman's
more recent Foreign Affairs (November/December 1994) article on 'The Economic Miracle that
Isn't". The economist Dani Rodrik of Columbia University, with whose analysis of the Far Eastern
miracle I am not in entire agreement, has properly commented on this flaw in Krugman's
approach; see his forthcoming letter in Foreign Affairs. The enormous importance of exports in
sustaining South Korea and Taiwan's ever-increasing investment and savings rates has also been
argued by the Oxford economist, Ian Little, who has long studied the trade and industrial policies
of developing countries.
4
 Perhaps I should not let Laura Tyson off so lightly. Thus, the well-informed expert on
technology policy, Claude Barfield Jr. has written in Issues in Science and Technology Winter
1994-95,in regard to the administration's R&D subsidy to flat panel displays (FPD) which is
tantamount to a production subsidy since it is conditional on starting nonexisting production, that:
"...much of the impetus for the FPD initiative appears to have come from the White House, not
DOD [Department of Defense]. Reports in the popular media confirmed that the administration
gives credit to Council of Economic Advisers chairwoman Laura Tyson and National Economic
Council leaders Robert Rubin and Bowman Cutter... Cutter stated that other civilian technologies
— robotics, ceramics, precision tools — would be candidates for similar efforts in the future"
(P-22).
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attack for emphasizing the "jobs" that "exports create". Of course, these
distinguished economists (though not all who write in Washington and get
quoted approvingly by the media) know that jobs are created by
macroeconomic policy. But this is fine political rhetoric which creates its own
reward in the form of support for good trade policy. Humorless critics exclaim:
ah, but that means that imports destroy jobs, which is ridiculously funny, of
course. But most people think that imports "destroy jobs" anyway, so when the
President talks of exports creating jobs, he is not corrupting an already
corrupted political discourse, he is only making a second-best correction.5 I am
inclined therefore to excuse this piece of economic illiteracy in a good cause!8
Let me then get down to the serious issues.
II. Successes: The Uruguay Round
The principal success of the administration has certainly been in seeing
the Uruguay Round through. The President deserves much applause for it,
even as we recognize that the initiative was Republican and the passage in the
Congress would have been impossible without Republican support in the end.
But the administration deserves less fulsome praise than the media, which is
not able to see the fine print or to put matters in larger perspective, lets it have.
(1) Weakening of Discipline: In particular, in the final stretch, the
President's negotiators seriously weakened the disciplines that are a key part
of the GATT. In particular, the Subsidies Code now accommodates "R&D"
subsidies generously whereas key provisions of the anti-dumping discipline
5
 Perhaps I should add the caveat that economists are well advised to be sparing in the use of
evidently wrong arguments just because they are politically useful currently, in my experience,
sloppy arguments can suddenly cause difficulties later. Thus, even the "exports create jobs"
argument may have locked the administration into a disastrous post-NAFTA situation where
theadministration turned a blind eye to the need for timely Mexican adjustment because a
Mexican devaluation and associated correction of an unsustainable current account deficit may
have been seen as seriously reducing US exports to Mexico and hence handing the Perostistas
and US unions a trump card prior to the November elections.
0
 Of course, one could cleverly argue that President Clinton may truly not understand that
jobs are created by macroeconomic policy, the reason being that he was Governor Clinton and
states do not have control over macroeconomic policy. I believe however that President Clinton is
quite capable of mastering the elementary economics at issue!
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were weakened below even the somewhat limited level that the Dunkel draft
had managed to write in.
Such compromises were presumably struck in the interest of assuring
passage by the Congress. But the choice of compromises from several
available must itself be explained. And here I believe that the choice was
excessively influenced by disregard for good economics.
(i) Thus, the R&D subsidy surely came from the Clinton advisers' desire
to have one, much in line with their view of the desirability of selective industrial
policy: the later action on flat panel displays by Defense (which I discussed
already) is exactly the sort of selective promotion of an industry that the Clinton
administration had in mind and which opens the door wider at the WTO for each
Contracting Party to walk subsidies aimed at industrial policy through it.
(ii) On the other hand, the anti-dumping compromises appear to have
been a concession to manufacturing interests. But administration economists
cannot absolve themselves entirely from blame. For, their Japan-fixation surely
must have handicapped them in fighting those who argued that it was of the
utmost importance to use anti-dumping actions to prevent Japanese predatory
exports. You are not exactly compelling when you agree that the Japanese are
unfair traders but contend in a nuanced way that anti-dumping measures are
inappropriate: you will sound a bit self-contradictory and probably a prisoner of
academic theology when you do that, losing credibility in the political game.
Your ability as economists to fight the good fight against the lobbying interests
seeking to weaken anti-dumping discipline gets sapped, as it clearly did.
But the actual situation, and culpability of the administration's
economists, may have been worse. Thus, if the recent New York Times column
(December 29, 1994) by Peter Passell, based on Greg Rushford's investigative
report on Eastman Kodak's legal activities, is an accurate guide, one of our
most distinguished, young trade theorists wrote a brief arguing that Fuji was
dumping film , apparently using "strategic trade theory" to show why. It is hard
to see how this brief, which I have not seen, could have properly reached this
conclusion, especially when Eastman Kodak argued in a separate anti-trust
case, which it also won, that the film industry was fully competitive because of
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many rivals (excluding therefore the ability of Fuji to be a predator who
would raise prices, after eliminating Kodak, to monopolistic levels in a sustained
fashion). But if this distinguished trade economist was presumably misled into
thinking that "strategic trade theory" showed that Fuji was indulging in predation
despite the evidence of substantial competition in the film industry and therefore
that anti-dumping action was justified7, it is not inconceivable that others (not so
smart) in the administration may equally have been misled by "strategic trade
theory" into deducing predation where none exists.
In fact, as Richard Clarida (who, along with Wilfred Ethier, has done
pioneering work in the modern theory of anti-dumping) has recently argued, a
proper judgment on the implication of modern Industrial Organization theory for
anti-dumping practice would conclude, not that predation is likely, but rather that
the conventional practice of deducing predation from below-cost pricing is
simply wrong and that, if anything, modern anti-dumping theory is even more on
the side of those who see it as a protectionist institution that cries out for reform,
if not elimination.8
(Hi) I am afraid that I must also express my deep disappointment with the
administration in succumbing to the demands for a US review panel to oversee
and double-guess adverse WTO Panel rulings against the US. This absurd idea
is the gift of Senator Dole and cannot be blamed on the administration. Where
one can indeed fault the administration again is in not ruling it out altogether or,
if a compromise had to be struck, in not broadening the review beyond three
adverse rulings to a review which would also include the findings in our favour.
The notion that findings must be scrutinized and WTO's "fairness" be judged
only by reference to cases that the US loses is surely an outrageous one that
threatens the integrity of the dispute settlement process. The President, in my
view, failed to provide firm leadership on this issue, much as I appreciate that
7
 Actually, the legal requirements for establishing dumping do not require predation to occur,
a fact that adds to the farcical nature of anti-dumping procedures from the viewpoint of
compatibility with sound economic reasoning.
8
 See his 1994 paper , "Dumping: In Theory, In Policy and in Practice" Onimeo. Columbia
University) for the Project on Fair Trade and Harmonization, directed by Jagdish Bhagwati and
Robert Hudec, under the auspices of the American Society of International Law and financed by
the Ford Foundation.
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the problem was created by Senator Dole in the first place. In consequence, he
undermined possibly the most important aspect of the WTO: the clear
establishment and affirmation of the rule of law, rather than the law of the jungle,
in dealing with trade disputes among nations.
(2) Environmental and Labour Standards: I am afraid that I would also
fault the administration for surrendering to the lobbies that have aggressively
pushed for the inclusion of Labour Standards via a Social Clause in the WTO,
and for not clearly and firmly rejecting the notion that different environmental
and labour standards across countries are a ground for withholding market
access to these countries.
I have argued the case for the legitimacy of diversity of standards at
length in several recent writings.9 The case against such diversity is unsound in
logic or untenable in empirical relevance. It also reflects protectionist pressures
as industries scramble to raise the costs of their rivals in the poor countries.
The question of imposing specific labour standards on other countries
raises other issues, chiefly of morality. But here too, the simplistic10 nature of the
moral rhetoric, as also the fact that it is almost always focused exclusively
against the poor countries (e.g. on issues such as child labour which are
overwhelmingly to be found in the poor counbtries, even as the amply-
documented transgressions such as those against migrant and immigrant
labour and the sorry plight in shape of high infant mortality and exposure to
serious hazards of the inner-city children in the rich countries are ignored in
the clamor for a Social Clause in the WTO) must be forcefully noted. It is
9
 Two recent articles may be cited: Jagdish Bhagwati and T.N. Srinivasan, 'Trade and the
Environment: Does Environmental Diversity Detract from the Case for Free Trade?", Yale
University Growth Center, mimeo.. 1994; and my 1994 Wincott Lecture, " The WTO: What
Next?", Columbia University Working Paper, 1994, to be published by The Institute of Economic
Affairs.
10
 Many commentators have also noted the difficulties in assuming that the morality on issues
such as child labour and minimum wages can be simply defined. If child labour is prohibited, and
children die of starvation, is that morally right? If minimum wages lead to not-so-poor insiders
gaining at the expense of the poor outsiders, is that morally desirable? Nearly all of the specific
demands on behalf of labour unions are debatable in this way; but you would not know that from
the self-congratulatory rhetoric about how the US is "exercising moral leadership" on these
issues!
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indicative of the tendency of these lobbies in the rich countries to throw stones
at others' glass houses while constructing fortresses around their own, and to a
tendency to exploit the white man's burden to secure the white man's gain.
I am afraid that the administration has more or less pandered to the
domestic lobbies on these issues, creating an unfortunate and avoidable North-
South divide on the issue at the WTO when in fact it should have stood up to
them and shifted the policy debate and action away from the WTO and on to
greater activism at appropriate international institutions such as the ILO for
examining labour standards and at the UNEP for pushing environmental
concerns. The aim should be to create a consensus on these questions, based
on argument rather than threats. In regard to labour standards, in particular,
where moral arguments (whose legitimacy is itself in dispute) are repeatedly
invoked, the use of force rather than suasion is both reprehensible and
inefficient11 . Surely, we should all agree that Christianity should be spread in
this modern age without the use of the Inquisition; it must compete, not be
hacked by the militia, to triumph in the battle for converts.
In these regards, the opposition of the Republicans to linkage between
environmental and labour issues to the freeing of trade, as exemplified in their
refusal to grant fast-track renewal with such linkage, is to be applauded as the
triumph both of good economic thinking and of true tolerance and liberalism
over self-righteous and self-serving threats and sanctions based on the
unilateral assertion of the superiority of one's preferences and one's morality.
Presidential leadership on these questions cannot long be deferred.
III. Failures: Japan Policy
The above failures are disappointing, though perhaps not momentous.
The real failure of the Clinton administration, however, was in regard to its trade
11
 It is reprehensible because policies and actions that are morally offensive to me should not
be forced on me by you just because you think that your views are morally superior to m ine. It is
also inefficient because, without conviction that the policies are morally right, I am unlikely to adopt




I have argued [in the last issue of The International Economy and also in
a Foreign Affairs. 1994 article entitled "Samurais No More"] the case against
the administration's early embrace of the twin pillars of folly: the assignment of
import targets (Voluntary Import Expansions, VIEs) to Japan's private industry
and the threat of Super 30I and 30I actions to whip them with trade restrictions if
these targets were not met.12 These ideas were strongly rebuffed by the
Hosokawa administration and have been rejected by the successor government
as well.
The administration has finally relented, putting its ill-considered Japan
policy into what looks like deep freeze. But we did lose nearly 18 months on
fruitless acrimony for reasons that were predicted pretty well by some of us at
the outset.
The media, deeply enthralled by the anti-Japanese rhetoric of the
revisionists who were the theoreticians of the administration's Japan policy, has
failed to understand and truly acknowledge the failure. The economists who
aided that policy have also escaped lightly: but then that is often the case. We
economists are almost never chastised for our mistakes the way engineers
have to pay if a bridge they had designed collapsed. As an economist who can
only expect to profit from this indulgence towards our profession, I cannot
complain!
IV: Subtle Failures: The Obsession with FT As
Finally, let me turn to a more subtle, and wholly ununderstood, failure of
the administration: namely, its continuing equation of Free Trade Areas (FTAs)
with Free Trade (FT) and its persistence in pushing ahead with these trading
12
 I must say that I was happy to hear Rudiger Dornbusch come out on my side finally by
criticising the "process" embodied in our Japan policy. Evidently, "process" could only mean the
imposing of targets and threatening retaliation if they were not met. But would I be uncharitable to
remind him that this process was precisely the one he himself (and only himself, among
economists) had urged the administration to adopt? For a documentation and a convincing
critique of his recommendation of this failed policy, see the fine pamphlet of Douglas Irwin,
Managed Trade: The Case Against Import Targets American Enterprise Institute: Washington
D.C., 1994.
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arrangements instead of concentrating on the jump-started, multilateral WTO.
Anne Krueger has already declared today her deep concerns with this
thoughtless pro-FTAs policy of the administration; I will reinforce her concerns.
At the outset, let me say that it is time that we realized that the phrase
Free Trade Areas is Orwellian newspeak. It lulls us, indeed editorialists and
columnists and politicians, into focusing only on the fact that trade barriers are
lowered for membersto the exclusion of the fact that, implicitly, the barriers are
raised (relatively) for nonmembers. FTAs are therefore two-faced: they embody
both free trade and protection. The reason is that they are inherently preferential
and discriminatory. Perhaps, as economists interested in the quality of public
policy discourse, we should take a pledge to rename the FTAs henceforth as
PTAs (i.e. preferential trade areas).
In that regard, let me say also that, during the lobbying campaign for
NAFTA — I should really call it NAPTA if I was to act on my suggestion above
an incompetently drafted statement of support for NAFTA made the rounds for
our signatures. It was notable for its implied equation of the case for the
proposed FTA with the case for free trade, obfuscating the real issues13 . I was
not asked to sign it and so the absence of my signature was not indicative of my
views. [In fact, the media, in writing on NAFTA, occasionally described me as a
notable signatory, assuming that I must have signed since I was a "free trader"
or, as an irate administration economist of great distinction who was upset with
my views and writings on Japan once denounced me, a "hyper-free trader".] I
have little doubt that many economists signed the ill-tutored statement of
support for NAFTA simply because, once the protectionist Ross Perot had
staked out his opposition to NAFTA, there seemed to be only a binary choice
13
 The debasement of the economic discourse from the opposite viewpoint comes, on the
other hand, from the occasional suggestion that, to join FTAs, countries need to satisfy prior
conditions on macro-stability et.al. Thus, in a recent study, the wellknown economists Gary
Hufbauer and Jeff Schott of the Institute of International Economics in Washington appear to list
several criteria for countries to be invited to join NAFTA, assigning weighted grades for this
purpose. This leaves me puzzled, if I have understood them correctly. Free Trade requires no
such preconditions, so why should FTAs? Ifit was correct to impose such prior conditions for us to
let them join us in freeing trade within an FTA, then we would have to revise all our textbooks and
treatises on international economics which argue that, no matter what other countries' own
policies, we will generally profit from freeing trade in a nondiscriminatory fashion. This type of
thinking in fact would inappropriately slow down trade liberalization if it spread from FTAs to FT.
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much like the choice from two tasteless entrees in a restaurant: support
protectionism or support NAFTA. Signing the imperfect statement in support of
NAFTA must have seemed the lesser of two bad choices, quite obviously.
Now that Ross Perot is out of the way, NAFTA has passed, and the
Clinton administration is embarked on extending NAFTA into new countries
starting with Chile and is understood also to be desirous of turning APEC into
an FTA, it is surely time to subject this pro-FTA policy to fierce scrutiny.14 Such
scrutiny, in my view, would expose this policy of the administration as a folly.15
For, in essence, the proliferation of such PTAs, where countries extend
preferences in different trading arrangements, creates a "spaghetti bowl"
phenomenon. Thus, the EU has different types of association agreements with
countries outside of the core members; the US has hub-and-spoke
arrangements with free trade with Israel which, in turn, is not a partner of
NAFTA; Israel has arrangements with EU and US; Mexico is a member of
NAFTA and of an aspiring APEC FTA; Mercosur is about to enter into
negotiations for a preferential trading arrangement with the EU, and so on. As
countries reach out for special deals, not just among developing countries (as
they have done for decades) but with the major trading nations as well, the
analogy with an orgy, with bodies intertwined and reaching out in different
directions, may be more apt in the increasingly salacious Washington.
The Spaghetti Bowl: Problems with Preferential Trading Arrangements
Such spaghetti-bowl proliferation of preferential trading arrangements
clutters up trade with discrimination depending on the "nationality" of a good.,
14
 The Economist, in a brilliant lead editorial in the end-of-the-year Double Issue, December
24th- January 6th, entitled "Battle Lines", raised much the same issue, asking for an examination
of the "increasing enthusiasm for regional, as opposed to global, agreements to liberalize trade"
and avoiding "the mistake of unreservedly supporting everything Ross Perot attacks". I
congratulate this magazine which, along with The Financial Times, has played a distinguished and
impressive role in raising the key analytical issues in regard to the world trading system in the last
half a decade, while the US business magazines have done little except to play to nationalist and
lobbying business viewpoints on issues such as NAFTA and Japan-bashing.
15
 For a fuller analysis, see also my 1994 Wincott Lecture in London, to be published by the
Institute of Economic Affairs and my Keynote Address in Tokyo in October 1994 at the
Symposium organized by Nihon Keizai Shimbun and the Ministry of External Affairs in celebration
of the 30th Anniversary of Japan's accession to the OECD.
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with inevitable costs that trade experts have long noted. In particular, consider
the following points, some relevant only to Free Trade Areas, the others more
general.
(i) Rules of origin, which are inherently arbitrary despite the Codifications
we must live with, multiply under Free Trade Areas because different members
have different external tariffs, making the occupation of lobbyists (who seek to
protect by fiddling with the adoption of these rules and then with the estimates
that underlie the application of these rules, as in the recent Canadian Honda
case) and of customs officers (who can make much money by assigning goods
to different origins as suggested by those fetching gifts) immensely profitable at
our expense. Anne Krueger and Kala Krishna have written extensively and
illuminatingly on this problem; so has the distinguished lawyer-cum-trade-
commentator, David Palmeter.
(ii) More generally, it is increasingly arbitrary and nonsensical to operate
trade policy of all kinds on the assumption that you can identify which product is
whose. When I was a student at Oxford in the 1950s, there used to be a Who's
Whose, designed to list the bondings (or "steady relationships" in our slang)
among the undergraduates. Needless to say, the sexual revolution and the rise
of uninhibited promiscuity put an end to it. Similarly, with the phenomenal
globalization of investment and production, a Who's Whose in defining trade
policy is an increasing anomaly, tying up trade policy in knots and absurdities
and facilitating protectionist capture.
Take some telling examples. We have tried assiduously to tell the
Japanese that exports from their transplants in the US to Japan are not to be
counted as US exports. On the other hand, when the Europeans tried to include
the cars exported from these very transplants in their VER quotas on Japanese
cars, Mrs. Carla Hills was up in arms! Again, just because imports from Japan
are sought to be controlled, rather than imports from all sources without
discrimination (as would be the case simply with a tariff or an auctioned VER),
we have the EU getting into knots about whether Japanese transplants in UK
are to be allowed freedom of access within the EU, and when would a car
produced in Oxfordshire be British rather than Japanese.
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Indeed, as the world economy increasingly muddies up the idealized
picture of Japanese, American, British, Indian and Mexican goods that drives
much of trade policy including particularly the pursuit of Free Trade Areas, the
more we trade economists can see the wisdom of the great trade theorists of the
past, Viner, Meade et.al., who were strongly wedded to nondiscrimination and
hence to MFN and multilateralism. As usual, a quote from Keynes, who had
renounced his earlier skepticism of nondiscrimination during the British-
American discussions of the design of the postwar Bretton Woods institutions,
from his speech in the House of Lords in 1945, says it best:
" [The proposed policies] aim, above all, at the restoration of multilateral
trade... the bias of the policies before you is against bilateral barter and every
kind of discriminatory practice. The separate blocs and all the friction and loss of
friendship they must bring with them are expedients to which one may be driven
in a hostile world where trade has ceased over wide areas to be cooperative
and peaceful and where are forgotten the healthy rules of mutual advantage
and of equal treatment. But it is surely crazy to prefer that ,"16
(iii) Again, it is frequently claimed that trade creation will be the order of
the day with FTAs and customs unions (CUs); hence we need not fear trade
diversion But, as I noted some years ago, when protection is administered (in
the form of VERs, anti-dumping actions etc.), it is selective and variable. The
endogeneity of such protection means that trade creation can turn into trade
diversion. Thus, if the US crowds Mexico in an industry, potentially creating
trade in the Vinerian sense, Mexico can, and probably will, start anti-dumping
action against nonmember suppliers and seek to accommodate thus both its
own and the US firms at the expense of nonmember suppliers, transmuting
trade creation into trade diversion.
At my suggestion a few years ago when I was Economic Policy Adviser to
the Director General of the GATT and we were planning an Annual Report on
Regionalism, Brian Hindley of LSE and Patrick Messerlin of Paris investigated
this possibility empirically to see if the well-documented anti-dumping actions
16
 Quoted (p.64) in The World Trading System at Risk. Princeton University Press: Princeton,
1991, based on the Harry Johnson Lecture that I delivered in July 1990. Italics have been
inserted.
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(especially against Japan and the Far East) of the EC could be so interpreted as
responses to the internal "trade-creating" competitive pressures rather than to
exogenous intensification of competition from abroad. Their verdict was: yes,
there is evidence in some cases that this had happened.17
The NAFTA's economist supporters, many untutored in any of these
nuances because few had any professional competence in the complexities of
trade analysis and realities, simply missed this important issue, focusing at best
only on the observed trade barriers. When you combine this observation with
the fact that our negotiators helped to weaken the improvement in discipline on
anti-dumping at the Uruguay Round, as I observed above, the folly of our trade
policy becomes obvious. Indeed, if you want to go down the PTA route, and to
minimize the possibility of trade diversion, be sure that there is far more (not
less) discipline on administered protection than we currently have!18
(iv) In regard to trade diversion, furthermore, Arvind Panagariya of the
University of Maryland, a distinguished trade theorist and policy analyst, has
raised the question: would not Mexico, and potential future developing
countries of South America seeking to join NAFTA, themselves suffer from
harmful trade diversion from joining NAFTA? Arguing that the US and Canada
are largely open, and comparing with the alternative of nondiscriminatory trade
liberalization, Panagariya has argued that trade diversion is indeed what
Mexico et.al. face, with the US and Canada gaining from the preferential trade
17
 The Hindley-Messerlin paper has now appeared in a volume edited by Kym Anderson and
Richard Blackhurst for the GATT and published by Harvester Wheatsheaf (UK), 1994.
18
 Of course, trade diversion itself may be the principal driving force behind the choice of FTAs
rather than nondiscriminatory trade liberalization as far as business lobbying is concerned. This
"incentive" or "political economy" aspect of FTAs versus FT has been raised by me in
"Regionalism versus Multilateralism: An Overview", published in 1994 in the World Bank volume
on the subject, edited by Panagariya and de Melo. It was also the subject of an Economics Focus
column in 1993 in The Economist. That business lobbies, interested in exports, may prefer to go
for preferential trade barrier reductions in their favour rather than investing efforts in opening
markets for their rivals as well is what I have long been stressing, noting the differential lobbying in
favour of NAFTA as against the Uruguay Round and the GATT. This idea has been analytically
pursued in recent theoretical papers by my Columbia University student Pravin Krishna and by
Arvind Panagariya and Ronald Findlay, the latter forthcoming in Gene Grossman and Robert
Feenstra (ed.), The Political Economy of Trade Reform. Essays in Honor of Bhagwati, MIT Press:
Cambridge, Mass., 1995.
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liberalization of Mexico et.al. and the latter losing from it.19
One may well object: why should Mexico et.al. then want to join NAFTA?
If the question is raised because it is inconceivable that the governments of
these countries would not be rational in their policy choices, then that
assumption itself must be clearly rejected. For one thing, as we know well from
aid experience and literature, one can seek something which sounds good but
actually does harm. Besides, the objectives of the leaders may be diversified.
Thus, for instance, they may expect to gain political kudos by going along with
NAFTA because, by granting preferential access to the US exporting interests,
and through the implied underlining of Mexico's special relationship to the US,
they may gain the support of the US in reaching out for prizes in a variety of
unrelated political arenas. Thus, for example, in the absence of NAFTA and the
willingness of President Salinas to put almost everything on the line for its
passage, can one seriously imagine that the US would have gotten Mexico into
the OECD20 or backed President Salinas for the important job of the Director
General of the WTO21?
(v) Perhaps the most frequently-repeated "non-economic" argument on
behalf of Mexico et.al. joining a preferential trade arrangement such as the
NAFTA has been that it helps to "lock in the reforms", giving them credibility. But
if this means locking in trade liberalization, I have argued that acceptance of
GATT bindings can equally lock in the liberalization. Besides, it is as difficult for
19
 Panagariya actually makes a persuasive case that Mexico et.al. are most likely to suffer a
welfare loss even if the comparison is with the initial situation rather than with unilateral trade
liberalization by them. In the latter case, the loss by Mexico et.al. is certain, of course, since US
and Canada are assumed to be open in all situations being compared. Cf. Panagariya, "The Free
Trade Area of the Americas: Good for Latin America?", University of Maryland, mimeo.. 1994.
20
 One may wittily remark that Mexico's undistinguished, low growth rate (by the standards of
most developing countries) during the 1980s qualifies it as an OECO country ! Seriously,
however, it is wellknown that Mexico got in because the US wanted this badly: as one of the
highest officials of the OECD told me in private conversation, "Secretary Lloyd Bentsen [a major
supporter of NAFTA] was very keen on it".
21
 Remember that Mexico got into the GATT only in 1985, nor is it exceptional among the
leading developing countries in terms of income level, sustained and high growth rates, effective
assault on poverty, level of industrialization, degree of scientific achievement, and other indices
that normally command one's attention. None of this, of course, is to detract from the significant
accomplishments of the young Mexican leaders and technocrats, including Finance Minister
Pedro Aspe, Trade Minister Jaime Serra and others in the splendid Salinas team, in moving
Mexico through difficult political and economic reforms.
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a small power like Mexico to get out of GATT obligations as it is to leave NAFTA
once you are in.
As regards NAFTA giving credibility to Mexico's reforms, the recent crisis
in Mexico lays that claim to rest just about as well as could be done. Real
credibility in your reforms can come only from the credibility of your economic
policies, not from an external pact like NAFTA, just as the announced
commitment to a fixed exchange rate carries no credibility if the underlying
macroeconomic policies are not themselves credible: it is the latter that give
credibility to the announced fixed exchange rate, not the other way around!
Thus, it is obvious that NAFTA has done little or nothing to establish the
credibility of Mexico's reforms at home or abroad; claims that it would and did
were simply so much hype that, repeated long enough by NAFTA proponents,
came to be accepted as incontrovertible truth by many.
The Problem with Present US Policy
In light of this analysis, I must confess that I find the approach taken by
the Clinton administration, albeit with Republican support, in support of the
pursuit of FT As alongside the WTO to be mistaken despite its excellent
intentions.
The approach seems to be, as reflected in the writings of the Treasury
Undersecretary Larry Summers (one of our brightest economists and quite
properly a star in the Clinton administration) and in the 1994 Report of the
Council of Economic Advisers22, that all forms of trade liberalization are good
since they move us in the direction of free trade: unilateralism, bilateralism,
plurilateralism, regionalism, multilateralism, indeed all "isms" , in Summers'
words, take you to liberalization.
But I wonder what Larry Summers would say if, on hearing that he
wanted our spending to be cut, I went upto him and said: cut anything you want,
wherever you wish, it does not matter what, as it all leads to reduced spending;
22
 See the Summers quote in Panagariya, 'The Free Trade Area of the Americas: Good for
Latin America?", op.cit.. ; and, for the Council of Economic Advisers, the following quote should
suffice: " ...the Administration is dedicated to working ... to open foreign markets through
bilateral , regional and multilateral trade agreements" , Economic Report of the President-
February 1994. Washington D.C., p.214.
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or, on hearing that he wanted revenues to be raised, I advised him, a wonderful
public finance specialist of the neoclassical variety, to raise any and every tax in
any way that he could since all taxes raised revenue. I am sure that he would
get rid of me from the Department of Treasury at the earliest.
Indeed, this "GATT-plus" approach which regards all types of trade
liberalization as simply separable and additive is essentially naive and wrong.
"GATT-plus" economics makes about as much sense as the "marriage-plus"
experiment was shown to make by Robert Redford and Demi Moore in the
movie An Indecent Proposal.
Let me say, however, that there are two circumstances under which I
would find the embrace of PTAs tolerable in principle23 :
*When a group of countries wants to develop a Common Market: in this
case, not just trade but also investment and migration barriers are eventually
eliminated just as in a federal state and the full economic and political
advantages of such integration follow; and
* When it is not possible to move to fully multilateral free trade for all
through multilateral trade negotiations (MTN), at the GATT or now the WTO, so
that the only feasible way to continue reducing trade barriers is to go down the
route of preferential free trade areas, seeking to spread them among as many
willing nations as you can find, in the hope that this route will eventually procure
worldwide free trade.24
The former argument underlay the European initiative for the Common
Market. The latter argument provided the original motivation for the United
States, a keen opponent of PTAs and an avid supporter of multilateralism
throughout the postwar period, to shift course and to embrace PTAs by initiating
the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) in 1983. The failure to secure
agreement from Europe and the developing countries to start a new Round of
MTN at the GATT Ministerial in November 1982 led Ambassador Brock to this
23
 The rest of my analysis below draws extensively on the penultimate section of my Wincott
Lecture, op.cit..
241 analyze below the empirical relevance today, and the merits generally, of this argument and
reject it as good policy.
19
approach.; and the intention then was certainly to use a hopefully ever-
expanding set of FTAs, with the US acting as both catalyst and nucleus, to
achieve the worldwide free trade that could not be reached through MTN at the
GATT any more.
Under Secretary James Baker, this open-ended approach, where the
US-centered FTAs would be open to any nation anywhere — they were
informally discussed with Egypt and ASEAN nations at the time —, became
captured by the proponents of "regionalism" who linked it instead, and
constrained it, to the Americas, as part of President Bush's initiative for the
Americas. Thus grew the fears at the time that the world was dividing into three
blocs: the EU, the Americas, and possibly a Japan-centered Asian bloc.
In the event, the US expanded CUFTA to NAFTA, and is now poised to
go down the FTA route more energetically, promising to take Chile and then
other South American nations on board. While the idea of regionalism is not
dead, the Washington policymakers, in response to criticisms including mine25,
have occasionally expressed the view that the earlier open-ended nonreglona!
FTAs approach will be adopted instead. Thus, President Bush, in a major
speech in Detroit at the end of the Presidential campaign, promised that he
would extend NAFTA to Eastern European nations and to the Far East. And
recently, the Clinton administration has tentatively suggested, according to
media reports, the possibility of extending NAFTA to South Korea and
Singapore.
But I must ask, in light of the many crippling defects of FTAs which I noted
earlier and which Anne Krueger has also pointedly raised today: is this
infatuation with FTAs?8 , including the pressure being exerted by the United
25
 Cf. Jagdish Bhagwati, "President Clinton's Trading Choices: Beyond NAFTA What?",
Foreign Policy. Summer 1993. I advocated there the position taken above that the best course
was to return now to multilateralism and to give up on further FTAs. But that, if FTAs were to be
pursued, then nonregional FTAs were better than regional ones because, among other reasons,
the regional approach would be more likely to promote fragmentation of the world economy into
preferential blocs.
20
 It is sometimes argued that the United States is mainly responding to the desire of the
South American countries themselves for an FTA of the Americas. This is misleading. There is no
doubt today about the desire of the administration to proceed with such an agenda, and the
catalytic effect that its desires are having currently in advancing that agenda.
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States and/or Mr. Fred Bergsten to move APEC in the direction of an FTA,
desirable when the multilateral trading system has already been iumpstarted
with the ratification of the Uruguay Round by the major trading nations and the
birth of the WTO? Would it not be wiser for the world's only remaining
superpower, and currently also its most robust economy, to take again the
leadership role on multilateral free trade and to focus on converting NAFTA into
a Common Market instead of seeking to extend it to more members and, given
the inherently-preferential nature of such free FTAs, spreading what can be
properly considered to be a stain on the now-realistic vision of a
nondiscriminatory world trading system?
This in fact would seem the sensible policy, with the second of the two
arguments cited earlier in support of FTAs then seen as lacking in force today.
However, it has been asserted, in defense of pursuing FTAs despite the
preferential nature of FTAs and the success of the WTO, that there is a benign,
symbiotic relationship between FTAs and the multilateral system, and that the
former is a faster process and: in turn, speeds up the process of dismantling
trade barriers and making progress generally at the WTO. Pursuing my
"marriage-plus" analogy, I might say that this is like the optimistic prescription for
"open marriage": adultery is seen as improving marriage. Superficially, this
scenario sounds plausible. But, on closer examination, it can be seen to be an
untenable view.
In particular, consider the popular argument that FTAs, at least where led
by the United States, will be of the "open regionalism" variety so that, with
steadily increasing members, we will arrive at full multilateralism. As
Dornbusch put it today, "you get two members and the third will want to be in",
and then the fourth and, to draw on Agatha Christie, "then there will be all" in the
FTA, arriving effectively at worldwide free trade just as we multilateralists want.
By contrast, and by implication, the WTO cannot lead to effective and speedy
liberalization on its own: it is too unwieldy.
But this contention is naive for several reasons. Take the question of
speed. FTAs are at least as hard to negotiate as multilateral trade treaties like
the Uruguay Round. After a decade, there are three countries in NAFTA; by
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contrast, the Uruguay Round took over seven years to negotiate, with over 115
nations and negotiations over a large range of old and new issues.
To argue that NAFTA expedited or smoothed the way for the conclusion
of the Round would be equally silly, though it is often done. Thus, President
Clinton's success with NAFTA is supposed to have helped him with his passage
of the Round through the Congress. True, President Clinton found his free-
trade voice on NAFTA; but why should we assume that he would not have found
it on the Round if it was the only game in town?
Also, remember the immense political divisions (far greater than over the
Uruguay Round) that arose over NAFTA. The proximity of Mexico, and the fear
that trade would only intensify the adverse effect that the much-noticed and
feared Mexican illegal immigration was exerting on real wages of the unskilled
in the United States, wound up making the freeing of trade with the poor
countries a fiercely controversial issue.27 It is hard to imagine that, with so
many issues and so many countries involved in the Round and hence diffusion
of focus instead of the exclusive focus on one particular country feared by the
unions and the workers as a palpable threat to their living standards, the politics
would have been as difficult on the Round by itself. The baggage of the NAFTA
fight was thus hurtful (in giving remarkable policitcal salience to an issue that
was almost created in the NAFTA crucible) to the cause of multilateral free trade
extended to developing countries generally, and hence to the passage of the
Uruguay Round and to the future functioning of the WTO (where issues such as
the Social Clause have also therefore gained more credibility), not helpful.
NAFTA's passage also was subject to Mexico's acceptance of the
27
 Free trade and free immigration are indirect and direct ways, respectively, in which a poor
country with abundant unskilled labour could reduce the real wages of our unskilled labour. This
has long been understood, both in the theoretical literature on trade and on immigration, and was
also implicit in the great debate in Britain prior to the enactment of the 1905 national legislation
restricting immigration: at the time, free traders were also free immigrationists and free immigration
was often called "tree trade in paupers". For a detailed analysis and documentation of these
questions, see my "Free Traders and Free Immigrationist: Friends or Strangers?", Russell Sage
Foundation, New York, 1991. It was thus perfectly plausible to me that, during the NAFTA debate
when the administration and Salinas kept talking about how NAFTA would reduce illegal
immigration, the response of many was contemptuously dismissive: according to them, we
needed to stop NAFTA and to stop illegal immigration directly by closing the border more
effectively.
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Supplemental Agreements on environmental and labour standards. But, as
Anne Krueger and I have already argued, this is exactly the wrong way to go:
why should such agreements be a precondition for freer trade? These
demands could have been successfully resisted, as they are so far, at the GATT,
whereas Salinas caved in simply because this was a superpower bargaining in
a one-on-one format with a vastly inferior power. In turn, this has strengthened
the environmental and labour lobbies into arguing that because NAFTA did it,
so must the WTO, and the Clinton administration has not been able to stand up
to these demands. In short, the NAFTA has made the WTO's business more
complex, not less.
In fact, I have argued that these and other lobbies cannot have escaped
the conclusion that the smart way to go is through US-centered FT As rather
than through the WTO, since you can first get Mexico to buckle under to these
demands, then tell Chile and others: this is how NAFTA is, so you must accept
these "nontrade" terms and conditions if you wish to come on board. Of course,
this strategy works so much better than trying to impose these extraneous,
indeed harmful, conditions through multilateral trade negotiations where all
these countries are together and have more bargaining power! So much then
for the idea of "open regionalism" or Ambassador Brock's idea of rapidly
expanding open-ended FTAs: yes, if you agree to several extraneous,
essentially trade-unrelated "side payments" (to use the terminology of John
Whalley in his work on CUFTA) or "conditions" which have nothing to do with
trade liberalization, you can qualify to join, not otherwise! It is like saying: my
bridge club is open to everyone provided they wear mustaches, smoke pipes,
wear ties and shine their shoes. This is openness indeed!
In fact, then, FTAs have become a process by which a hegemonic power
seeks to (and often manages to) satisfy its multiple nontrade demands on other,
weaker trading nations better than through multilateralism; the persistence of
FTAs despite the success of the WTO must be traced at least partly to an
awareness of this reality.28 And, if this analysis has an element of truth to it, then
FTAs seriously damage the trade liberalization process by facilitating the
28
 See the discussion in my 'Threats to the World Trading System: Income Distribution and
the Selfish Hegemon", Journal of International Affairs. 1994.
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capture of it by extraneous demands that aim, not to reduce trade barriers, but to
increase them (as when market access is sought to be denied on grounds such
as "eco dumping" and "social dumping").
To sum up, my view therefore is that the FT As, aside from being
preferential trading arrangements with the economic drawbacks I outlined
earlier, are a particularly damaging institutional arrangement to legitimate in the
world trading system. The time has surely come for international economists to
cut through the Orwellian newspeak, and the sloppy argumentation, of Free
Trade Areas and begin to think the unthinkable: should FT As really continue to
qualify under Article XXIV or should it be revised to apply only to groups of
countries aiming to create a Common Market T9
I am afraid that the Clinton administration is unlikely to even raise these
questions. It is currently wedded to the wrongheaded FTA approach as the
President shuttles from one regional summit to another, blissfully unaware of
these issues and applauded by a media that cannot rise above the glitter of the
staged regional summits.
Meanwhile, a battle could be joined between the US (and its Latin
American allies) and the Asian nations at the next APEC meeting in Osaka,
Japan, over the issue of whether APEC should also become an FTA as the US
seems to want. I believe that Japan and the Far Eastern superperformers could
use this opportunity to play a leadership role in halting the US slide towards
obsessive FTA-mindedness and restoring a principal focus on multilateralism at
the WTO. Let me explain why.
Japan and the Far Eastern superperformers, known often as the new
Japans, have produced supreme examples for the rest of the world by
transforming their nations into world class economies in just one generation of
phenomenal growth. Many talk in economics of the "Japanese miracle": I
sometimes wonder if ours is after all not truly a "dismal science" if, every time an
economy does strikingly well, we call it a miracle!
True, many seek in this outstanding success the validity of their own pet
29
 As far as I know, the archival research has not been done to tell us why both FTAs and CUs
were included in Article XXIV. I speculate on the original rationale of Article XXIV in The World
Trading System at Risk op.cit.
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policy prescriptions. And, indeed, few things can be explained in terms of a
single cause. But, even though my own pet theory is that outward-orientation
produces major dividends for a country, I think there is broad agreement that
Japan and the new Japans have done tremendously well by going for world
markets.30
Thus, preferential free trade areas where you set your sights low by
thinking only of FTA-limited markets, instead of rooting for free trade where you
are going for the world's markets, have not characterized this area. Even
ASEAN , a grouping of political significance, had no economic dimension of
substance for much of its life. Multilateralism came naturally with these attitudes.
It may be argued that these attitudes were strengthened in turn with economic
success whereas pro-FTA attitudes have often been associated with economic
weakness: Imperial Preference went with Britain's fear of the newly-emerging
competition from Germany and the United States, whereas the NAFTA debate
betrayed a similar desire of many business groups and politicians to keep
Mexico's markets for themselves instead of sharing them with Japan and the
EU. This aMexico-is-for-us" sentiment even found its way into some of President
Clinton's speeches in favour of NAFTA, you will recall, playing equally to the
Japan-bashing sentiment in Washington.31
But, while we may debate the many reasons for these Asian nations'
desire to go for the world's, rather than just regional and subregional, markets,
it surely provides Japan and the economically successful Far Eastern nations
with a potential leadership role in world trade policy.
30
 In regard to imports, there has certainly been "controlled openness" in Japan; and the role
of protection in her development, as of the other Far Eastern nations, is more complex than made
out by ideologues on the side of either free trade or protection.
31
 It was noteworthy that President Zedillo, beleagured by the peso crisis, also cited Mexico's
"privileged access" to the US market as an argument for keeping confidence in Mexico's
economic soundness. As I remarked, the name of the FTAs game is discrimnation!
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The post-Uruguay agenda at the WTO will inevitably involve our looking
again at Article XXIV in a much more careful way than has been done to date.
But more than that, the new Director-General of the WTO will have to provide
leadership that seeks to shape the emerging picture of exploding preferential
trade groupings and to confront its impact on WTO-centered multilateralism,
instead of simply accepting their emergence as a foregone political reality. In
this task, the role of countries such as Japan, and the Asian nations, which have
generally and indeed properly kept away from preferential trade arrangements
like FT As, in providing countervailing support to the WTO leadership will be
essential.
In the meantime, Japan and indeed the other Asian members of APEC
can play a useful role at APEC itself by opposing its being turned into yet
another FTA. APEC can set an example by rejecting such a mcdc! and using
the arrangement rather as a way of coordinating policies in the region on
questions such as an Investment Code and, equally important, on the new
issues before the WTO (such as the Social Clause) that I have touched upon
today. My informed guess is that, on those issues as well, Japan and the Asian
nations have much to offer that is closer to what I have suggested. APEC, since
it straddles part of Asia and part of the Americas, may well be the place for
these remarkable Asian nations to bring their friends across the common ocean
to greater wisdom on these new issues and thus to assist the development of
the WTO in more appropriate directions.
It may be thought that, after the Indonesian meeting of the APEC where
free trade within APEC was embraced as a goal for 2020, this is a lost cause.
But it is not. The goal is, in fact, unattainable, without MFN extension of the
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trade barrier cuts in general to other WTO members, without turning APEC into
an FTA: but an FTA version of APEC has not been embraced as a goal. Equally,
it is wholly improbable that this (or any) region would extend trade
concessions within the region on an MFN basis to nonmembers automatically:
that is simply not what trading nations, especially those belonging to
preferential trading areas, do! So, despite the rhetoric from Jakarta, the issue
whether APEC will turn into another FTA or alternatively become a
nondiscriminatory, multilateralism-stressing institution that would buttress rather
than rival the WTO, remains unsettled. The rhetoric of 2020 lacks presently the
clarity of 20/20 vision. And that is all to the good, for it means that there is still
hope that the APEC will not turn into another FTA on the world trading scene.
When APEC meets next year in Osaka, Japan in particular will have the
opportunity to provide leadership on its future role and its relationship to the
new WTO, helping to reshape and shift our trade policy on FT As and
multilateralism in the right direction. I suggest that it do so by:
* working with the United States and the European Union towards, and
announcing at the next G-7 meeting, a new follow-up multilateral trade
negotiation at the WTO, with the agenda of this new Round to be worked out in
a specified time frame;
* seeking agreement among the Asian APEC members (including
prospective new Asian members such as India) that APEC would not become a
preferential FTA, while ensuring that the American members of the APEC (led
by the United States) are confronted clearly on the broader issue of the utmost
importance, i.e. whether multilateral free trade, not a spaghetti bowl of
preferential free trade areas, is to be the centerpiece of the newly emerging
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world trading system;
* at the same time, embracing an APEC agenda that includes
coordination of policies and positions at the WTO and the new Round on
matters such as the wisdom of inclusion at all of labour standards and the
optimal nature of the inclusion of environmental matters in the WTO; and
* transforming President Suharto's call for free trade in the APEC region
by 2020 explicitly into a concerted effort to achieve this goal by a succession of,
not APEC-alone liberalizations, but focused APEC initiatives, in conjunction
with G-7 (whose non-European members are members of APEC), to launch
multilateral trade negotiations to reduce trade barriers worldwide on a
nondiscriminatorv (MFN) basis.
This can be Asia's central contribution to the design of the new world
trading system, in keeping with Asia's commitment in the postwar period to a
nonregional, nonpreferential approach to world trade.Whether Japan and Asia
can rise to the leadership role that is required now on these central questions of
the design of the new world trading system, undertaking a pro-active policy, or
whether they will continue to play a reactive role that leaves leadership and
hence the architecture of the new world trading system entirely to others, is a
key issue now. If the architecture of the new world trading system is left to the
United States on its current course, and to the European Union which too has
proliferated all kinds of preferential arrangements with other countries not in the
core of the Common Market, it is likely that the dilution of the multilateral trading
regime by the spaghetti bowl of preferential trading arrangements will be our
fate. That would be a tragedy.
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